Report

Fissile material and nuclear force structure in North Korea

This report from UK think tank RUSI offers a nuanced exploration of North Korea’s approach to deterrence.

This paper offers a nuanced exploration of North Korea’s approach to deterrence by examining the trade-offs in arsenal structure amid fissile-material constraints. North Korea remains one of the most opaque nuclear states in the world, offering little information about its nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) and weapons programme. Yet, the structure and scope of its programme have significant implications for global stability. There is a need for a robust analytical methodology that can derive insights from limited data to assess North Korea’s NFC and nuclear strategy. Such analysis is crucial for the international community, particularly should diplomatic avenues reopen, providing a rare opportunity to curtail or reverse North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

This paper builds on work conducted by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) to model North Korea’s NFC. It integrates VERTIC’s estimates of North Korea’s production of weapons-usable fissile material – specifically weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) – into a comprehensive framework that assesses Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy. By examining the trade-offs in arsenal structure amid fissile-material constraints, the paper offers a nuanced exploration of North Korea’s approach to deterrence.