Preliminary lessons from Ukraine’s offensive operations, 2022–23
Think tank: RUSI
Author(s): Dr Jack Watling; Oleksandr V Danylyuk; Nick Reynolds
July 18, 2024
This report from UK think tank RUSI examines the causes of the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 to avoid the repetition of such errors in the future.
The purpose of this report is to examine the causes of the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 to avoid the repetition of such errors in the future and to inform the regeneration of offensive combat power in NATO militaries.
The original concept of operations for the Ukrainian offensive was sound. It required 12 armoured and mechanised brigades to achieve a breakthrough along 30 km of frontage, the isolation of Tokmak within seven days, and thereafter a breakout south towards Melitopol. Tempo was supposed to prevent Russia from bringing the majority of its forces to bear, so that the attacking force would need to overcome only six regiments in defence.
This concept of operation was not implemented. This arose from operational errors made by both Ukraine and its international partners. Ukraine’s international partners missed two critical decision points prior to the offensive.
First, whereas Russia began to transition to a war economy from May 2022 and began the mobilisation of troops from the autumn, Ukraine’s international partners did not take significant steps to address their industrial limitations. In consequence, while many nations gifted Ukraine a significant proportion of their national stocks, this did not amount to a sufficient volume of equipment to provide the doctrinal minimum of critical enablers required for the concept of operation to be executed.
The second decision point missed was when that equipment needed to arrive in Ukraine. Ukraine’s international partners wasted four months in deciding to act, so that only a part of the pledged equipment arrived in Ukraine prior to the offensive, and the Ukrainian brigades did not have enough time to train on the equipment that did arrive.
The brigades were, therefore, undertrained at the start of the offensive, which accounts for a significant proportion of the tactical mistakes made during the execution of the operation.
