Report

Shopping for mass destruction: North Korea’s illicit procurement networks

This report from UK think tank RUSI draws on underexploited source material to offer an overview of North Korea’s procurement networks over the past five years.

This paper analyses North Korea’s procurement networks, particularly in view of North Korea’s programmatic successes and recent geopolitical shifts in Russia’s relationship with North Korea as a result of the war in Ukraine.

Despite successes in its nuclear and missile programmes over the past few years, North Korea still relies on external sources of technology to supply its weapons programmes and will continue to do so in the long term. Procurement networks with tentacles all around the world have been used by the country to obtain technology from willing exporters and naive businesses, and to dupe those trying to comply with export controls over the past decades. These networks will continue to be key to the sustainment of North Korea’s programmes and further technological progress.

This paper analyses North Korea’s procurement networks, particularly in view of North Korea’s programmatic successes and recent geopolitical shifts in Russia’s relationship with North Korea as a result of the war in Ukraine.

The paper draws on underexploited source material to offer an overview of North Korea’s procurement networks over the past five years. It finds that North Korea’s networks are active and will remain so, and are likely seeking to make up for the slowdown in procurement during the period of Covid-19-related border closures, and to fulfil recent Russian orders for missile technology.