
The impact of a Taiwan Strait crisis on European defence
Think tank: RUSI
Author(s): Dr Sidharth Kaushal; Juliana Suess
November 20, 2024
This report from UK think tank RUSI examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in a potential Taiwan crisis, as well as which are of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency.
This report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in a potential Taiwan crisis, as well as which are of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency. There is an emergent policy consensus within the US that the period from 2027 to the early 2030s represents one of acute danger for Taiwan. This view was captured by former Commander US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who predicted that an invasion of Taiwan by China is possible by 2027, a view echoed by other senior figures. If the US must commit substantial forces to deterrence or defence in the Indo- Pacific, this will have significant second-order effects within Europe.
By the end of this decade, the partial reconstitution of Russian forces is likely, as is the growth of Russian capacity with respect to capabilities, such as nuclear submarines, which have not been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine.
This report examines which US capabilities will be most relevant in an Indo- Pacific contingency, as well as which capabilities among these are fungible – that is, of utility both in Europe and in a Taiwan contingency. Its purpose is to identify areas where gaps are most likely to emerge in Europe’s defensive posture as a consequence of the potential reallocation of US capabilities.