Report

Linking forces: Western support for the Russian diaspora

This report from UK think tank the Henry Jackson Society examines Western support for the Russian diaspora.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has understandably focused the Western response on supporting Ukraine. However, the ‘as long as it takes’ rhetoric should have been relegated to the dustbin of slogan history and replaced with ‘giving Ukraine what it needs to win the war quickly’. While the Western focus on Ukraine is prudent, there must be a plan for when Vladimir Putin’s regime collapses in Russia.

In an earlier report, we set out the stance that Western governments should take to support Russian diaspora groups to plan for a democratic future-Russia. As the current Russian regime is intent on imperial grandeur and destabilising the European security order, it is in the West’s security interests to support the Russian diaspora to prepare a democratic future-Russia plan for when Putin falls.

We have covered one requirement necessary to prepare for a democratic future-Russia – declaring Putin illegitimate. By declaring Putin illegitimate, Western states can support Ukraine, increase their military posture in Eastern Europe to show that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has teeth to Moscow, and support Russia’s neighbours, with European Union (EU) integration particularly Moldova and Georgia. While Western governments have refrained from declaring Putin illegitimate, both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the EU’s European Parliament (EP) have passed resolutions doing so. We hope that this will be the precursor for Western governments to declare Putin illegitimate, and to fully support Ukraine fully to win the war quickly and the Russian diaspora to develop a coherent democratic future-Russia plan.

To begin developing a comprehensive democratic future-Russia plan, it is necessary to first gauge the different Russian diaspora opposition groups to get as wide a support network for a future-Russian plan as possible. However, Western governments remain uncertain of the different diaspora groups – which ones to support, and what their policies are. This report goes some way to alleviating this problem. This does not take away from the actions of opposition groups within Russia, but the groundwork – and running – will likely happen outside Russia as the Kremlin continues its descent towards totalitarianism. In 2023, the authorities increased surveillance spending by 160%. While ideally, opposition groups in Russia should be involved in devising a democratic future-Russia plan they face arrest if they go public. The Russian 2012 law on ‘foreign agents’ has gone through several iterations, but after 2022, the legislation was toughened to include anyone “under foreign influence”. Therefore, realistically, diaspora opposition must take primary responsibility for implementing any plan.

This leads to another problem. Like many operating in autocracies, the Russian opposition has a trust problem. While mostly this is down to regime repression of their networks, competition for finite financial resources from Western governments also contributes to the distrust. The new film series by the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) arguing that Putin is a continuation of the corruption and political instability of the 1990s ruffled the feathers of opposition leaders who were involved in the politics of that period. Given opposition division and mistrust, it is imperative that an effective democratic future-Russia plan has the support of as large a coalition as possible for success and is ready for when Putin falls. There have been three meetings already between factions of the Russian diaspora opposition, civil society activists, and public figures in Brussels and Berlin . Yet meetings have been attended by only some of the diaspora opposition groups.

This report aims to set out the different views of some key factions and assess their policies (for example, on Russia’s future and cooperation with other groups), to map out areas of overlap and to facilitate targeted dialogue and cooperation despite general mistrust. In identifying such areas, the report can help Western governments streamline and target their support between the disparate groups. Cutting through the mistrust is crucial to begin planning for a democratic future-Russia that has the support of most diaspora groups. This is what this report sets out to do.